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The Jury Vetting Cases: New Insights
on Jury Trials in Criminal Cases?
Vanessa MacDonnell*

I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2012, the Supreme Court of Canada delivered its
reasons for judgment in the jury vetting cases of R. v. Yumnu,1 R. v. Emms2
and R. v. Davey.3 In each case, the Crown requested and received
material “on the suitability of prospective jurors”4 from the police.
In Yumnu and Emms, the Crown also requested criminal record checks,
which the police completed. When the parties expressed concern about
this vetting in the Court of Appeal, the Court concluded in all three cases
that it was not an attempt to undermine the impartiality of the jury.5
It also held that there was no “reasonable possibility”6 that the Crown’s
actions had affected the make-up of the jury.7 These findings played a
significant role in the Supreme Court’s disposition of the appeals.

*
Assistant Professor, University of Ottawa Faculty of Law (Common Law Section). Thank
you to Leo Russomanno, the participants in the 2012 Constitutional Cases Conference, the
participants in the 2013 University of Ottawa Women’s Writing Retreat, the editors and the
reviewers for very helpful comments and suggestions. Thank you to Brittany Murphy for research
assistance, made possible by the Foundation for Legal Research.
1
[2012] S.C.J. No. 73, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 777 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Yumnu”].
2
[2012] S.C.J. No. 74, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 810 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Emms”].
3
[2012] S.C.J. No. 75, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 828 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Davey”]. In fact, there were
five cases. Yumnu’s appeal was heard along with the appeals of two co-accused, Cardoso and Duong.
4
Id., at para. 12. I will refer to the “suitability of prospective jurors” or “potential jurors”
throughout.
5
This conclusion is explicit in the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decisions in Yumnu and
Davey, and implicit in its decision in Emms, though there is no doubt that this is Moldaver J.’s
conclusion in the Supreme Court. See Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 34, citing R. v. Yumnu, [2010]
O.J. No. 4163, 260 C.C.C. (3d) 421, at para. 95 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Yumnu CA”]; Davey, id.,
at para. 23; R. v. Emms, [2010] O.J. No. 5195, 104 O.R. (3d) 201, at para. 61 (Ont. C.A.); Emms,
supra, note 2, at para. 49.
6
Yumnu, id., at para. 75.
7
Id., at para. 8; Emms, supra, note 2, at para. 17; Davey, supra, note 3, at para. 21.

420

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d)

In three unanimous opinions, the Supreme Court explained that the
Crown could request a criminal record check “on potential jurors to determine whether they are eligible to serve as jurors”,8 but that any
criminal record would have to be disclosed to the defence. If the police
received additional material from this process suggesting that a juror
might be ineligible or “partial”,9 the Crown could rely upon it, but again
it would need to be disclosed.10 The Court also held that the Crown could
only discuss matters of jury selection with officers working on the case
(rather than with the police more broadly), and that it would have to disclose any relevant material received from those officers.11 The Court
went on to conclude that the Crown need not disclose “opinions”,12
“general impressions, personal or public knowledge in the community,
rumours or hunches”.13
While the Supreme Court’s ruling goes a long way toward eliminating the concerns associated with jury vetting, there is a disconnect
between the Court’s description of the jury selection process and how
counsel tend to think about jury selection in criminal trials.14 While
counsel are limited in their ability to influence the jury selection process,
the Court might nevertheless have considered whether a full ban on jury
vetting was needed to combat the risk — both real and perceived15 —
that the Crown might act unethically during the jury selection process.16
In my view, the provincial government would do well to vest sole authority for conducting criminal record checks in the provincial authorities
tasked with creating jury panels.17

8

Yumnu, id., at para. 50.
Davey, supra, note 3, at para. 10. I will refer to “partial”, “partiality” and “partial to the
Crown” throughout.
10
Yumnu, supra, note 1, at paras. 53-54.
11
Davey, supra, note 3, at paras. 34, 38, 40-42.
12
Id., at para. 48.
13
Id., at para. 46.
14
For a sampling of these views, see David Paciocco et al., Jury Selection in Criminal
Trials: Skills, Science, and the Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 1997) [hereinafter “Paciocco et al.”].
15
Tim Quigley, “Have We Seen the End of Improper Jury Vetting?” (2013) 98 C.R. (6th)
109, at 112 [hereinafter “Quigley”].
16
R. v. Bain, [1992] S.C.J. No. 3, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bain”];
Quigley, id., at 112.
17
Factum of the Criminal Lawyers Association in R. v. Emms, R. v. Yumnu et al. and R. v.
Davey, at para. 13 [hereinafter “Criminal Lawyers Association Factum”]. For similar proposals, see
Quigley, id., at 111; Ann Cavoukian, Excessive Background Checks Conducted on Prospective
Jurors: A Special Investigation Report (Toronto: Information and Privacy Commissioner, 2009), at
142-43 [hereinafter “Cavoukian, Excessive Background Checks”].
9
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Beyond their immediate usefulness in deciding the issues before
the Court, Yumnu, Emms and Davey also raise interesting questions about
the essential and inalienable features of jury trials in criminal cases.
These questions arise against the backdrop of a web of Charter18
protections, including the section 7 right to disclosure; the section 11(d)
right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial decision-maker;
the section 11(f) right to trial by jury; and the section 15 right to
equality.19 One of the anomalies in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in
relation to juries and jury selection is its near absence of engagement
with the right to trial by jury. This leaves some doubt as to whether the
right to trial by jury consists of anything more than the bare right to be
tried by a jury if charged with a certain category of offence.20 While the
Court does not invoke the right to trial by jury in Yumnu, Emms or
Davey, its statements about the essential features of jury trials in criminal
cases renew questions about the precise contours of the right.
In Part II of this article, I review the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Yumnu, Emms and Davey. In Part III, I suggest that despite the
disconnect between the way the Court describes counsel’s “role in the
jury selection process”21 and the way that some lawyers approach jury
selection, the Court’s decisions, if respected, largely address the possibility
of unethical Crown conduct by jury vetting. In Part IV, I discuss the largely
under-theorized right to trial by jury, and in Part V, I conclude.

18
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
19
See Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson
Reuters, 2010) [hereinafter “Stuart”]; Factum of the Intervener David Asper Centre for
Constitutional Rights in R. v. Kokopenace, 2013 ONCA 389 and R. v. Spiers, 2012 ONCA 798
[hereinafter “Asper Centre Factum”]. See also Cynthia Petersen, “Institutionalized Racism: The
Need for Reform of the Criminal Jury Selection Process” (1992-1993) 38 McGill L.J. 147
[hereinafter “Petersen”].
20
Stuart, id., at 455. Section 11(f) of the Charter states: “Any person charged with an offence
has the right ... (f) except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a military tribunal, to
the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five
years or a more severe punishment.” The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 also provides an
entitlement to — and sometimes effectively mandates — a jury trial: see ss. 471, 473, 565(2) and 568,
cited in Peter Sankoff, “Rewriting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Four Suggestions
Designed to Promote a Fairer Trial and Evidentiary Process” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 349, at 361-62
[hereinafter “Sankoff”]. See also Benjamin L. Berger, “Peine Forte et Dure: Compelled Jury Trials
and Legal Rights in Canada” (2003) 48 Crim. L.Q. 1 [hereinafter “Berger”]; R. v. Turpin, [1989]
S.C.J. No. 47, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Turpin”].
21
Bain, supra, note 16, at 116, per Gonthier J., dissenting. I will refer to counsel’s “role in
the jury selection process” throughout.
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II. THE CASES
1. Yumnu
In Yumnu, three co-accused were tried and convicted of second degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.22 Following oral
argument on appeal, it emerged that the police had vetted potential jurors
prior to the jury being selected.23 Specifically, the Crown had forwarded
the jury panel lists to the police and requested that they indicate if potential jurors had a criminal record or were otherwise “disreputable persons
we would not want as a juror [sic]”.24 The police complied with the request, and provided the Crown with the result of the criminal record
checks as well as other material collected in the process.25
The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that “the purpose of the police inquiries was to determine whether a prospective juror had a
criminal record”26 (which would be relevant to his or her eligibility for
jury duty), and that there was no ill motive on the part of the Crown or
the police in conducting the vetting.27 The Court also concluded that the
Crown’s actions “had no impact on the composition of the jury”28 and
that the Crown and the police’s actions did not render the trial unfair or
“bring the administration of justice into disrepute”.29 The Supreme Court
affirmed these conclusions.
Writing for the Court, Moldaver J. noted that jury vetting was “risky
business”,30 a course of conduct that could not only render trials unfair
but that could also impact upon the “integrity of the criminal justice system”.31 Despite this, he concluded that some jury vetting could continue.
The Crown could request criminal record checks from police due to
shortcomings in the existing system of relying on individual jurors to
remove themselves if they were not eligible for jury duty because of a
prior criminal conviction.32 In addition, while the police were not entitled

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Yumnu, supra, note 1, at paras. 1, 19.
Id., at para. 4.
Id., at para. 21.
Id., at para. 25.
Yumnu CA, supra, note 5, at para. 94, cited in Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 34.
Yumnu, id., at para. 82.
Id., at para. 88.
Id., at para. 37.
Id., at para. 36.
Id., at paras. 37, 38.
Id., at paras. 48-50.
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to seek out additional facts about potential jurors, material that came to
the police’s attention through the process of completing a criminal record
check could be passed on to the Crown, who could make use of it as
needed during the jury selection process.33 All such material, Moldaver J.
held, would also be required to be disclosed.34
Justice Moldaver then made two observations about the existing
process of conducting criminal record checks. He noted that because the
Crown knows little more than the name and profession of potential jurors, the police are often required to consult more than one source to be
able to say with sufficient certainty whether an individual has a criminal
record.35 As he explains:
[T]he more databases accessed, the more likely it is that the authorities
will come upon information that goes beyond a particular province’s
eligibility criteria as it relates to prior or ongoing criminal activity, or
the criteria needed to bring a challenge for cause under s. 638(1)(c) of
the Code.36

If the government provided the Crown with more data about potential
jurors, the police would need to consult fewer sources.37 This would
mean that there would be less chance that a criminal record check would
“inadvertently”38 turn up other material about potential jurors.39 Justice
Moldaver also noted that the Provincial Jury Centre, which assembles
jury panels and serves as a stand-in for sheriffs for the purposes of the
Juries Act,40 has jurisdiction under section 18.2 of the Juries Act to
“request that a criminal record check, prepared from national data on the
Canadian Police Information Centre database, be conducted” for the
purpose of determining juror eligibility.41 The Provincial Jury Centre’s
current practice is to conduct spot checks involving approximately
33

Id., at paras. 53-54.
Id., at paras. 51, 55.
35
Id., at paras. 56-57.
36
Id., at para. 58.
37
Id., at paras. 56, 59.
38
Id., at para. 53.
39
Id., at paras. 58-59.
40
R.S.O. 1990, c. J.3.
41
Id., s. 18.2(1). See also Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 60. This provision was added in
2009 following the release of a report by the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner on jury
vetting which “recommended [that] the Provincial Jury Centre … be the only agency entitled to
access criminal records databases”: Marie Comiskey, “Does Voir Dire Serve as a Powerful
Disinfectant or Pollutant? A Look at the Disparate Approaches to Jury Selection in the United States
and Canada” (2011) 59 Duke L. Rev. 733, at 750-51 [hereinafter “Comiskey”].
34
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10 per cent of the jury panel.42 While Moldaver J. could be read as
implying that the Provincial Jury Centre could assume full responsibility
for completing criminal record checks of potential jurors, he also noted
that not all provincial juries legislation confers this authority on the body
that assembles jury panel lists.43
Turning to the issue of disclosure, Moldaver J. noted that while the
Crown is required to disclose “information received by the Crown that is
relevant to the jury selection process”,44 it need not disclose material related
to “the prospective juror’s general reputation in the community … feelings,
hunches, suspicions, innuendo, or other such amorphous information”.45
While he declined to deal fully with the issue of whether the defence was
also required to make disclosure in similar circumstances, Moldaver J.
noted that defence counsel would be required to advise the court and the
Crown if counsel had “good reason to believe that a potential juror has
engaged in criminal conduct that renders him or her ineligible for jury
duty”46 or if there was “good reason to believe that a potential juror cannot
serve on a particular case due to matters of obvious partiality”.47
Finally, Moldaver J. made a series of general comments about the
Crown and the defence’s role in jury selection and about the function of the
jury.48 After noting that “[t]he process is not governed by the strictures of the
adversarial model, nor should it be”,49 Moldaver J. went on to articulate four
basic features of the jury: eligibility, impartiality, representativeness and
competence.50 He noted that impartiality was constitutionally mandated, and
that jury selection should be approached with the objective of ensuring that
the accused receives a trial consistent with the section 11(d) right to a fair
trial by an independent and impartial decision-maker.51
Justice Moldaver then applied a “modified”52 version of the
Dixon/Taillefer53 test to determine whether the Crown’s failure to disclose

42

Yumnu, id., at para. 61.
Id.
44
Id., at para. 51.
45
Id., at para. 64.
46
Id., at para. 66.
47
Id., at para. 67.
48
Id., at paras. 70-72.
49
Id., at para. 71.
50
Id.
51
Id., at para. 72.
52
Davey, supra, note 3, at para. 56. I will refer to the test as “modified” throughout.
53
R. v. Dixon, [1998] S.C.J. No. 17, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 244 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dixon”];
R. v. Taillefer, [2003] S.C.J. No. 75, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Taillefer”].
43
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the material in its possession about potential jurors warranted a new trial.
He expressed the relevant legal standard as follows:
[P]ersons who seek a new trial on the basis that such non-disclosure
deprived them of their right to a fair trial under s. 7 of the Charter
must, at a minimum, establish that: (1) the Crown failed to disclose
information relevant to the selection process that it was obliged to
disclose; and (2) had the requisite disclosure been made, there is a
reasonable possibility that the jury would have been differently
constituted.54

Focusing his analysis on the second requirement, Moldaver J. affirmed
the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the accused could not show that the
jury would have been “differently constituted” but for the Crown’s failure to provide the material in its possession to the defence.55
Justice Moldaver also dealt with the question of whether the jury
vetting in this case occasioned a miscarriage of justice.56 He emphasized
that the Court of Appeal had concluded that “[t]here was no attempt on
the part of the police or the Crown to uncover information about
prospective jurors in an effort to obtain a favourable jury”.57 He added
that the Rules of Professional Conduct contemplated that the Crown
might undertake some form of vetting of potential jurors,58 and that the
Crown had acted “in good faith”.59 Taking these factors into account, as
well as the fact that the Crown’s actions “had no impact on the
composition of the jury … the outcome of the trial or the overall fairness
of the trial process”,60 Moldaver J. concluded that there had been no
miscarriage of justice.
2. Emms
In Emms, the Court applied the legal principles articulated in
Yumnu and reached a similar result.61 Emms was charged with multiple
counts of fraud. When the Crown received the jury panel lists, it
forwarded those lists to the police and requested that the police
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 75.
Id., at para. 77.
Id., at para. 79.
Id., at para. 82.
Id., at para. 82.
Id., at para. 83.
Id., at para. 88.
Emms, supra, note 2, at para. 5.
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complete criminal record checks. As in Yumnu, the Crown indicated
that “[i]t would also be helpful if comments could be made concerning
any disreputable persons we would not want as a juror [sic]”.62 Emms’
trial post-dated the release of a Practice Memorandum by the Ontario
Ministry of the Attorney General placing significant constraints on jury
vetting by the Crown.63 The Practice Memorandum stated that jury
vetting should not extend beyond completing criminal record checks.
It also directed that the results of these checks should be shared with
the defence.64 Despite the issuance of the Practice Memorandum, the
Crown continued to request not only that criminal record checks be
completed, but also that the police provide material relevant to
the suitability of potential jurors.65 In this particular case, the police
provided the Crown with other data it had gathered in the process of
completing the criminal record checks. It also expressed its approval or
disapproval of individuals on the jury panel list.66 Defence counsel was not
provided with any of this material.67
The Court of Appeal held that while the defence used two peremptory challenges that it probably would not have used but for the Crown’s
failure to disclose the material it received from police, the resulting jury
was impartial, and the outcome of the trial would have been the same had
proper disclosure been made.68 Justice Moldaver affirmed these findings,
noting that Emms had not satisfied the second branch of the modified
Dixon/Taillefer test.69
Justice Moldaver also rejected the argument that the actions of the
Crown and the police had occasioned a miscarriage of justice, even
though the case had proceeded after the Ministry of the Attorney General
had issued the jury vetting Practice Memorandum.70 In his view, the
Crown’s actions could not be attributed to “malevolence or intentional

62

Id., at para. 7.
Id., at para. 11. See also Quigley, supra, note 15, at 112.
64
Emms, id., at para. 11.
65
Id., at para. 44.
66
Id., at paras. 8-9.
67
Id., at para. 10.
68
R. v. Emms, [2010] O.J. No. 5195, 104 O.R. (3d) 201, at paras. 49, 50 (Ont. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Emms CA”], cited in Emms, supra, note 2, at para. 17.
69
See supra, note 53; Emms, id., at para. 29.
70
Emms, id., at paras. 43-44.
63
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wrongdoing”,71 nor was there anything to suggest that the Crown’s goal
had been to craft a “favourable” jury.72
3. Davey
Justice Karakatsanis authored the final opinion in the trilogy. Davey
was a high-profile murder case in which the victim was a police officer.73
Before the jury was selected, the Crown forwarded jury panel lists to
police detachments in the area and made a similar request for material as
in Yumnu and Emms.74 In concluding that the Crown went too far,
Karakatsanis J. stated that “the Crown should not have the advantage of
the use of state resources, which are not available to the defence, to
choose a jury that may be perceived to be favourable to the Crown”.75
She went on to conclude, however, that the Crown was not barred from
seeking the input of police officers who were directly involved in the
case.76 If a police officer provided “relevant information”77 to the Crown,
or where it was “unclear whether a bald police opinion [wa]s based upon
such information”,78 the Crown would be required to disclose the
material.79 Mere “opinions” did not generally need to be disclosed,
however.80
In reaching these conclusions, Karakatsanis J. reviewed the basic
features of the jury in criminal cases, providing a slightly different itemization than Moldaver J. in Yumnu. She noted that juries ought to be
“independent, impartial and competent”.81 She observed that “neither
party has the right to select a jury, or has a positive power to shape a
jury”,82 and that “[j]urors are selected at random, and randomness ensures representativeness”.83 She also emphasized that at the jury selection
stage, the Crown and the defence have a common purpose: “[a]s officers

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id., at para. 44.
Id.
Davey, supra, note 3, at paras. 4, 15.
Id., at para. 12.
Id., at para. 34.
Id., at para. 9.
Id.
Id.
Id., at para. 9.
Id., at para. 46.
Id., at para. 30.
Id., at para. 31.
Id.
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of the court, all counsel have a responsibility to uphold the Charter right
… to an independent and impartial jury”.84
Justice Karakatsanis then applied the modified Dixon/Taillefer test
described by Moldaver J. in Yumnu. She stated in obiter that before a
court concluded that a new trial should be ordered in a case in which the
modified test was satisfied, the court should first ask whether “on balance … the jury was impartial”.85 Applying the test, she concluded that
while the Crown’s disclosure was insufficient, this did not affect the
make-up of the jury. She also held that the accused had received a fair
trial by an impartial jury.86 She noted that due to the high profile nature
of the case, the Court had put many questions to potential jurors as part
of the jury selection process, and that a large number of potential jurors
who might have been partial were ruled out as a result.87
Finally, Karakatsanis J. also concluded that the Crown and the
police’s conduct did not give rise to an “appearance of unfairness”
sufficient to constitute a miscarriage of justice.88 Justice Karakatsanis
noted that the extensive questioning by the court during the selection
process eliminated individuals who might have been considered propolice.89 She was also favourably impressed by the Crown’s decision to
disclose both that the victim’s brother-in-law appeared on the jury panel
list90 and that one of the jurors made a comment adverse to the accused
before trial.91

III. THE PROBLEM OF JURY VETTING
The jury vetting cases raise interesting questions about counsel’s role
in the jury selection process. Indeed, in Yumnu, Emms and Davey, the
Court proceeded on the assumption that the police and the Crown could
do great damage by “investigating”92 members of the jury panel. “The
mere thought of the Crown and the police ‘checking out’ potential jurors
carries with it the spectre of jury tampering and the evils associated with
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id.
Id., at para. 55.
Id., at para. 10.
Id., at para. 15.
Id., at para. 74.
Id., at para. 77.
Id., at paras. 13, 78.
Id., at paras. 19, 78.
Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 52. I will use this language throughout.
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it”,93 Moldaver J. warned in Yumnu. “Care must be taken to guard against
this. The integrity of our criminal justice system hangs in the balance.” 94
The Court’s high rhetoric is at odds with the Crown’s actual ability to
influence the make-up of the jury through jury vetting. Before elaborating, I should say that I believe the Court was correct to remind the
Crown of the constitutional imperatives of impartiality and full disclosure. I also agree with Tim Quigley that the Court “failed to place enough
stress on the appearance of justice” and that it should have concluded
that miscarriages of justice had occurred.95 But the Court’s comments
create the false impression that the Crown could have used the material it
received from police to craft a pro-Crown jury. This is simply not the
case. The Crown cannot “select” jurors per se; it can only exercise a peremptory challenge to “exclude”96 a particular juror from the jury, or
make submissions on why a particular juror should be dismissed for
cause.97 If no basis for a challenge for cause exists, then the Crown can
only challenge the juror if it has peremptory challenges available to it. In
other words, the Crown has no ability to “select” jurors whom it believes
might favour its position.
In addition, the constitutional (and longstanding common law) imperative of impartiality means that the Crown is permitted — perhaps
even required — to exclude potential jurors who may be biased against
the Crown.98 Thus, it cannot be assumed that excluding individuals who
might be pro-defence involves a form of “jury tampering” — indeed, the
opposite may well be true. If sufficient evidence of partiality exists, then
a potential juror may be challenged for cause.99 Where the Crown suspects but cannot establish partiality,100 on the other hand, it is appropriate
for a peremptory challenge to be used.
93

Id., at para. 38.
Id. See also Davey, supra, note 3, at para. 29.
95
Quigley, supra, note 15, at 112. See also Factum of the British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association in R. v. Emms, R. v. Yumnu et al., and R. v. Davey [hereinafter “BCCLA Factum”].
96
Bain, supra, note 16, at 115, per Gonthier J., dissenting on other grounds. I will use this
term throughout.
97
Davey, supra, note 3, at para. 31; Bain, id., at 115, per Gonthier J., dissenting on other
grounds.
98
See Bain, id., at 156, per Stevenson J.: “It is, indeed, proper for the Crown to use the
process to put aside jurors who may be partial to the accused.”
99
Id., at 153, per Stevenson J.
100
R. v. Gayle, [2001] O.J. No. 1559, 54 O.R. (3d) 36, at para. 59 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter
“Gayle”], citing R. v. Cloutier, [1979] S.C.J. No. 67, 48 C.C.C. (2d) 1, at 20-21 (S.C.C.); Bain,
supra, note 16, at 152-53, per Stevenson J.; Neil Vidmar, “The Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching
for a Middle Ground” (1999) 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 141, at 158 [hereinafter “Vidmar”].
94
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What is left, then, in terms of unacceptable behaviour in which the
Crown might engage, and is there any relationship between this behaviour
and jury vetting? To begin, the Crown might exercise its peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory manner.101 This compromises the
representativeness and the impartiality of the jury.102 Discriminatory jury
selection may or may not be based on material derived from jury vetting.
There was no evidence in Yumnu, Emms or Davey that jury vetting
provided the Crown with material that could have formed the basis of a
discriminatory use of the Crown’s peremptory challenges. Post-trilogy, it
seems unlikely that the process of completing a criminal record check
would produce material that the Crown could use to exercise its
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner, though it should be
noted that by their very nature, peremptory challenges require counsel to
make stereotypical assumptions about individuals and groups.
The Crown might also choose not to challenge a juror whom it
believes to be partial to its case.103 It may have formed this opinion based
on material derived from jury vetting. But the chances of the police
coming across this kind of material during the jury vetting process have
always been low. Post-trilogy, they approach zero. The evidence in
these three appeals and in another prominent jury vetting case in Ontario,
R. v. Spiers,104 suggests that jury vetting turned up a variety of material
about potential jurors, most of it about their criminal past.105
Occasionally the police found evidence to suggest that an individual
frequently reported matters to the police or that he or she had been a
“victim” or a “complainant” in an unrelated matter,106 but this evidence is
less likely to surface now that the police may only perform criminal
101
See, e.g., R. v. Pizzacalla, [1991] O.J. No. 2008, 5 O.R. (3d) 783 (Ont. C.A.). See also
Gayle, id., at para. 65. Note that in Gayle, the Court dealt with the issue under s. 11(f). See also
Petersen, supra, note 19; Steven Penney, Vincenzo Rondinelli & James Stribopoulos, Criminal
Procedure in Canada (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2011), at 664 [hereinafter “Penney et al.”].
102
Asper Centre Factum, supra, note 19, citing R. v. Williams, [1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998]
1 S.C.R. 1128, at para. 48 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Williams”]; Petersen, id.
103
Such a practice was condemned in Bain, supra, note 16, at 119, per Gonthier J., dissenting:
“[T]he Crown Attorney should use the means at his or her disposal to exclude prospective jurors that
could be biased in favour of the prosecution even if the defence is not aware of this fact.” But see Bain,
id., at 159, per Stevenson J., cited in Penney et al., supra, note 101, at 663: “The peremptory challenge is
not, in itself, under attack. It may be used for partisan considerations, and so long as the right of exercise
is proportionate neither the Crown nor the accused can be said to have an unconstitutional advantage.”
104
[2012] O.J. No. 5450, 113 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Spiers”]. See also factum
of appellant Clare Spiers in Spiers [hereinafter “Spiers Factum”].
105
Yumnu, supra, note 1, at paras. 53-54.
106
Yumnu, id., at para. 25; Spiers Factum, supra, note 104, at para. 16.
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record checks and offer existing knowledge if they are directly
involved in the case.
In sum, the vast majority of this evidence could not be used by the
Crown for any purpose other than to eliminate from the jury pool individuals who might be biased against the Crown. It is far from clear that
there is anything preventing the Crown from drawing the inference that
individuals who have had previous experiences with law enforcement
might not be impartial, and challenging the individual on that basis. The
Crown might similarly conclude that an individual who has made a complaint on a previous occasion or who has been a victim might have a
difficult time maintaining impartiality. In this context, would the Crown
also be required to exclude the juror?
The starting point in answering this question is that the Crown and the
defence have an obligation to do what they can to ensure that the jury is
impartial.107 If the Crown has reason to believe that a juror may be partial,
either for or against the Crown, then it has an ethical obligation to exclude
that juror. But here additional complications arise. Where there is clear
evidence of bias, the Crown may challenge a juror for cause. In the vast
majority of cases, however, the Crown and the defence will be making its
decisions about whether to challenge a juror on the basis of something
less than conclusive evidence of bias or impartiality. In many cases, the
Crown or the defence may only have a “hunch”108 or an “instinct”109
about the likely partiality of the witness. In these circumstances, we
cannot confidently suggest that the Crown is in breach of its obligations if
it fails to challenge someone whom it has a “hunch” may be biased. As a
general rule, however, the standard for challenging a juror who might not
be impartial should be the same regardless of whether the individual’s
partiality favours or disadvantages the Crown.
Occasionally, the Crown may decide not to challenge a juror whom it
ought to challenge, either because it is not satisfied that there is enough
evidence of partiality, or because of what the Supreme Court of Canada
in R. v. Bain called “human frailt[y]”.110 This is why the presence of defence counsel is crucial. The defence’s role in jury selection includes
being particularly vigilant for jurors who might not be impartial but who
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See generally Penney et al., supra, note 101, at 439-41.
Davey, supra, note 3, at para. 46.
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the Crown has less of an incentive to challenge. Equally crucially, however, the defence can only participate effectively in jury selection if the
Crown and the defence have “equal information about the prospective
jurors”.111 It is unsurprising, then, that disclosure plays such a key role in
the Court’s reasons in Yumnu, Emms and Davey. If the defence does not
have access to the same material as the Crown, then it cannot effectively
weed out partiality that inures to the benefit of the Crown.
Thus, in the normal course, the Crown’s ability to “tamper” with the
jury is limited. Post-trilogy, the Crown must disclose any relevant evidence uncovered through a criminal record check or by speaking to
police who are directly involved in the case.112 This means that in practice, the Crown and the defence should have “equal information”.113 To
the extent that the Crown falls short of its obligation to discharge jurors
who might be partial to the Crown, the defence is equipped with the material it needs to challenge the juror. The result is that the Crown’s ability
to “tamper” with the jury is greatly reduced.
Justice Moldaver notes in Yumnu that the Provincial Jury Centre
has the statutory authority to request that criminal record checks be
conducted by the police on its behalf. He notes, however, that not all
provinces have such provisions in their provincial juries legislation. In
my view, the provincial government would do well to transfer sole
control over criminal record checks to the Provincial Jury Centre.114
This would eliminate the possibility that a criminal record check would
“inadvertently”115 turn up material about potential jurors, and would
provide further protection against the risk — real or perceived116 — that
the Crown might not exercise its peremptory challenges ethically.117 It
would also remove the perception of collusion between the Crown and

111
Factum of the appellant Cardoso in R. v. Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 30 [hereinafter
“Cardoso Factum”]. See also factum of the appellant Davey in Davey, supra, note 3, at paras. 52-53.
112
I take it that the R. v. Stinchcombe, [1995] S.C.J. No. 21, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 754 (S.C.C.)
standard of “not clearly irrelevant” is what in fact applies here.
113
Cardoso Factum, supra, note 111, at para. 30.
114
Criminal Lawyers Association Factum, supra, note 17, at para. 13. For similar proposals, see
Quigley, supra, note 15, at 111; Cavoukian, Excessive Background Checks, supra, note 17, at 142-43.
115
Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 53.
116
See Quigley, supra, note 15, at 112.
117
Concerns about how peremptory challenges are exercised have led to calls for the repeal
of the Criminal Code provisions that permit them: see, e.g., Petersen, supra, note 19. A thorough
examination of this proposal is beyond the scope of this paper, though the arguments in favour of
repeal are compelling. Thank you to Professor Bill Stuntz for sharing his insights on the problems
associated with peremptory challenges with his criminal procedure class, which I took in 2008.
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the police that the Court expresses concern about in these cases.118 In
this respect, it is interesting to note that the Court’s earlier, more
realistic statements about the potential ethical shortcomings of the
Crown did not find their way into these judgments, particularly in a
case in which the Crown did not comply with its own Practice
Direction.119 Had the Court taken note of the possible “human frailties”
of Crown counsel (and the police), it might have been unwilling to
sanction any jury vetting.120
A final point: the Court does not deal in any depth with the question
of whether the defence might also be required to disclose material relevant to jury selection to the Crown, noting only that the defence must
advise the Crown and the court if they have material suggesting that a
potential juror is ineligible or if they “know or have good reason to believe that a potential juror cannot serve on a particular case due to
matters of obvious partiality”.121 While the defence does not have a duty
of disclosure in other contexts, these obligations seem obvious and uncontroversial. The accused would not be disadvantaged by such an
obligation, given that at the jury selection stage, the Crown and the defence are united in the common purpose of ensuring impartiality. In any
event, it seems unlikely that the comparatively under-“resource[d]”122
defence would engage in extensive vetting.

IV. THE CONTENT OF THE SECTION 11(f) RIGHT TO
TRIAL BY JURY
As has been noted, the right to trial by jury has played surprisingly
little role in the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence in relation to
juries and jury selection, and Yumnu, Emms and Davey are no
exception.123 One of the most extensive discussions of the right can be
found in R. v. Turpin, a case that raised the issue of whether the right to
trial by jury included a right not to be tried by a jury.124 By contrast, the
Court has adverted to the right to a fair trial by an independent and
118
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impartial decision-maker in a number of jury selection cases, including
Yumnu and Davey.125
On one level, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court failed to
mention, much less consider, the applicability of section 11(f) of the
Charter.126 The right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial
decision-maker arguably encompasses most of the constitutional concerns
that might be raised by an accused in the context of a jury trial.127 The jury
vetting cases were not framed as section 11(f) cases, and the Court was
clearly preoccupied with both the disclosure issues and with whether the
jury selected was impartial within the meaning of section 11(d). In the
only other jury vetting case to be heard by the Supreme Court since 1982,
R. v. Latimer,128 the Court did not refer to the Charter at all, preferring
to rest its reasoning on the “fundamental tenet of the criminal justice
system” that “justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and
undoubtedly be seen to be done”.129 Nevertheless, it is worth asking
whether some of the essential features of the jury identified and reaffirmed by the Court in these cases might ultimately find recognition as
elements of the right to trial by jury, or whether the right is destined to
remain neglected, conferring little more than the bare right to be tried by a
jury if charged with a certain category of offence.130
Theorizing about the jury through the lens of constitutional rights
only gets us so far, of course. Individual rights are not the Court’s sole
concern at the jury selection stage.131 Juries perform a “democratic”
function,132 and this means that the process of selecting the jury has a
125

See Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 72; Davey, supra, note 3, at para. 31.
But see R. v. Parks, [1993] O.J. No. 2157, 15 O.R. (3d) 324, at para. 28 (Ont. C.A.)
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R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.).
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at 259 (K.B. Div.).
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prohibiting the government from abolishing trial by jury in cases of a serious nature”: see Sankoff,
supra, note 20, at 361.
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“social” dimension that is not co-extensive with the interests of either the
accused or the Crown.133 Moreover, even the broader legal framework
does not capture all of the factors relevant to jury selection. As Moldaver
J. explains in Yumnu:
[W]hile there are various rules and regulations that govern the selection
of juries, much of what occurs is rooted in custom. The process must
take into account the needs of the people and the special problems that
may exist in the locale or region in which the trial is being held.
Flexibility is essential, as is common sense, good judgment and good
faith on the part of those who play a central role in the process.134

That being said, the Charter does confer a right to trial by jury. To the
extent that the accused has a right to a jury with certain features, the jury
vetting cases might provide some insight into the content of that right.
Justices Moldaver and Karakatsanis refer to similar essential features
of the jury — eligibility, independence, impartiality, randomness, representativeness and competence — but they do not go so far as to say that these
features are guaranteed by section 11(f). This is consistent with the Court’s
general reluctance to provide guidance on the content of section 11(f).
In my view, there are two main reasons for this state of affairs. First,
many of these features are protected by section 11(d). Second, the Court
may be reluctant to read the right to trial by jury expansively because to
do so would threaten the historic approach to jury selection and — by
extension — certain accepted truths about juries.135 In at least some instances, it would require courts to permit additional inquiries into
whether the jury actually possessed the features required of it by the
Charter. This would expand the scope of in-court vetting of potential jurors beyond that currently permitted by the Criminal Code and the
common law and would undermine the dubious but entrenched presumption that jurors are impartial, competent and the like.136
Elections, Juries and Illegitimacy” (1984) 18 U.B.C. L. Rev. 351, at 391 [hereinafter “Smith”];
Christopher Granger et al., Canadian Criminal Jury Trials (Toronto: Carswell, 1989), at 9. See also
Yumnu, supra, note 1, at para. 71.
133
Turpin, supra, note 20, at 1309-10. See also Yumnu, id.
134
Yumnu, id., at para. 72.
135
Thank you to Jula Hughes for sharing a similar insight with me in the context of the
Court’s reluctance to rely on social science evidence in the criminal law context. See also Vidmar,
supra, note 100; Sankoff, supra, note 20, at 368-69; Dianne Martin, “Book Review of Jury Selection
in Criminal Trials: Skills, Science and the Law” (1998-99) 30 Ottawa L. Rev. 318 [hereinafter
“Martin”].
136
Penney et al., supra, note 101, at 652, citing R. v. Sherratt, [1991] S.C.J. No. 21, [1991]
1 S.C.R. 509 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sherratt”]; Vidmar, supra, note 100, at 150, citing R. v. Hubbert,
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Interestingly, this presumption is less intact in the context of the
guarantee of a fair trial by an independent and impartial decisionmaker.137 In fact, the Court has denounced the very judicial hesitation
that we see in the context of the right to trial by jury.138 It may be that
because section 11(d) contains an explicit guarantee of a fair trial by an
independent and impartial decision-maker, the Court feels that it has little
choice but to give content to the right. In addition, the Criminal Code
sets out a detailed scheme for challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. In other words, “Parliament itself has acknowledged that jurors
may sometimes be unable to set aside their prejudices and act impartially
between the Crown and the accused, despite our hope and expectation
that they will do so”.139
While in-court vetting of potential jurors does not raise the same
issues as the jury vetting conducted by the Crown and the police in
Yumnu, Emms and Davey,140 its expansion would move the Court further
away from the existing paradigm of jury selection.141 We need not regard
this as problematic. Courts have never taken the position that the values
to which the jury selection process seeks to be faithful are best
accomplished by a hands-off approach.142 Those who are concerned that
it would unacceptably alter the jury selection process to recognize a right
to a jury with certain features need look no further than the Court’s
[1975] O.J. No. 2595, 29 C.C.C. (2d) 279 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1977] S.C.J. No. 4, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 267
(S.C.C.); Williams, supra, note 102, at para. 13; R. v. Burke, [2002] S.C.J. No. 56, [2002] 2 S.C.R.
857, at para. 65 (S.C.C.), per Major J.; Gayle, supra, note 100, at para. 22; Parks, supra, note 126, at
paras. 21-22, noting that “the ‘presumption’ … is well established, both as a fundamental premise of
our system of trial by jury and as an operative principle during the jury selection process”. See also
BCCLA Factum, supra, note 95, at para. 31.
137
In the context of challenges for cause, see Parks, id., at paras. 32, 41.
138
See Williams, supra, note 102, at para. 51:
[B]ehind the conservative approach some courts have taken, one detects a fear that to
permit challenges for cause on the ground of widespread prejudice in the community
would be to render our trial process more complex and more costly, and would represent
an invasion of the privacy interests of prospective jurors without a commensurate increase in fairness. Some have openly expressed the fear that if challenges for cause are
permitted on grounds of racial prejudice, the Canadian approach will quickly evolve into
the approach in the United States of routine and sometimes lengthy challenges for cause
of every juror in every case with attendant cost, delay and invasion of juror privacy.
139
Williams, id., at para. 24.
140
BCCLA Factum, supra, note 95, at para. 35.
141
Id.
142
Peremptory challenges and challenges for cause have been permitted by the Criminal
Code in one form or another since its enactment in 1892 (see Penney et al., supra, note 101, at 663,
n. 207), and the practice dates back to before 1305: id., at 663. See also Williams, supra, note 102;
Sherratt, supra, note 136; Parks, supra, note 126, at para. 58.
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gradual acceptance of a greater scope for questions to be put to potential
jurors about their ability to impartially judge a case involving a racialized
accused to see that permitting such inquiries will not fundamentally reorient the jury system143 or open the door to “U.S.-style jury voir dire”.144
The Supreme Court has placed significant trust in the ability of trial
judges to “[control] the challenge process to prevent its abuse, to ensure
that it is fair to the prospective juror as well as to the accused, and to
prevent the trial from becoming unnecessarily delayed by unfounded
challenges for cause”.145 It has also rejected precisely the sorts of
arguments that may be holding the Court back from giving constitutional
recognition of other features of the jury.
To provide just one example, in Davey, Karakatsanis J. re-states the
now well-accepted principle that “randomness ensures representativeness”.146 This principle has been shown to be quite problematic,147 most
recently in criminal trials and coroner’s inquests involving indigenous
accused and deceased, respectively.148 These events led the Ontario
Government to request an independent review of “First Nations representation on Ontario juries” by former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Frank
Iacobucci.149 His report, delivered in February 2013, outlines serious deficiencies in the representation of indigenous people on juries in the Province
of Ontario.
While the Supreme Court has hinted that representativeness is a
pre-requisite to a fair trial and thus may find protection under
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section 11(d),150 some members of the Court have expressed skepticism
about whether representativeness should be recognized as a constitutionally
guaranteed feature of jury trials in criminal cases. In R. v. Sherratt, the
Supreme Court explained that “the Charter right to trial by jury is
meaningless without some guarantee that it will perform its duties
impartially and represent, as far as is possible and appropriate in the
circumstances, the larger community”.151 In Williams, the Court noted
that “a representative jury pool” was an “essential safeguard” of “the
accused’s section 11(d) Charter right”.152 But in R. v. Biddle, McLachlin
C.J.C., writing for herself in the context of a challenge to a jury
comprised of 12 women, expressed doubt about whether the accused
should be permitted to challenge the jury pool or the resulting jury on the
ground of lack of representativeness. She stated:
To say that a jury must be representative is to set a standard impossible
of achievement. The community can be divided into a hundred different
groups on the basis of variants such as gender, race, class and
education. Must every group be represented on every jury? If not,
which groups are to be chosen and on what grounds? If so, how much
representation is enough? Do we demand parity based on regional
population figures? Or will something less suffice? I see no need to
start down this problematic path of the representative jury, provided the
impartiality and competence of the jury are assured. Representativeness
may be a means to achieving this end. But it should not be elevated to
the status of an absolute requirement.153
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With respect, McLachlin C.J.C.’s comments (in obiter) overstate the
concerns that might arise from guaranteeing a representative jury and
understate courts’ ability to craft a doctrine that ensures an adequate
degree of representativeness. Courts would do well to consider
recognizing the constitutional nature of representativeness by confirming
that representativeness is a component of the right to trial by jury under
section 11(f). The Court could also read sections 11(d) and 11(f) together
to reach such a result.154
Moreover, there is no reason to be concerned that a right to a representative jury would bring about significant additional costs or delays in
the trial process.155 Representativeness is usually an issue that is considered at the level of the jury panel, though challenges have also been
brought to the make-up of the jury that is actually selected.156 In other
words, a right to a representative jury would intrude very little, if at all,
into the jury selection process. Indeed, many of Iacobucci J.’s recommendations in his Report on First Nations Representation on Ontario
Juries relate to the development of jury panel lists rather than the process
to be followed at the jury selection stage.157

V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Yumnu, Emms and Davey provide
clear guidance on the extent to which the Crown may engage in jury vetting. In my view, the provincial governments should vest exclusive
authority for performing criminal record checks in the provincial jury
authority charged with compiling jury panels. As Cory J. stated in Bain,
“[t]he protection of basic rights should not be dependent upon a reliance
on the continuous exemplary conduct of the Crown, something that is
impossible to monitor and or control. Rather the offending [power]
should be removed.”158

Schuller & Neil Vidmar, “The Canadian Criminal Jury” (2011) 86:2 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 497, at
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The jury vetting cases do not get us much further in terms of
understanding the content of the right to trial by jury. I have suggested that
some, if not all, of the essential features of the jury might properly be
considered to be constitutionally guaranteed by section 11(f). At the very
least, the Court ought to read sections 11(d) and 11(f) together, so that
section 11(d) does not do all the conceptual heavy-lifting and so that the
right to trial by jury does not become a merely vestigial right.

